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I. INTRODUCTION
URING this Survey period, Texas courts addressed several inter-
esting issues, including (1) whether an insurer may have a duty
to indemnify even it has no duty to defend, (2) the scope of vari-
ous exclusions under a standard commercial general liability policy, and
(3) whether the Stowers doctrine is implicated when a settlement demand
requires funding from multiple insurers and no single insurer can fund the
settlement within the limits that apply under its particular policy. The
effect of an insured's failure to provide timely notice of a lawsuit under
the notice condition of a claims made insurance policy was the subject of
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two significant Texas Supreme Court opinions during last year's survey
period. This area of the law continued to evolve during this Survey pe-
riod as Texas courts continued to interpret and apply the holdings from
those cases. Further, the Fifth Circuit addressed the implications of the
"in fact" language of certain provisions of a directors' and officers' liabil-
ity policy, and whether the "eight corners rule" prevents an insurer from
examining extrinsic evidence in determining whether it should reimburse
its insured for defense costs under a policy that imposes no duty to de-
fend. Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court resolved the question of
whether coverage under a standard homeowners' policy exists for dam-
age to a dwelling caused by mold from plumbing leaks.
II. NOTICE PROVISIONS
A. NOTICE UNDER A CLAIMS-MADE AND REPORTED POLICY
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ex-
amined the consequences of an insured's failure to comply with a notice
condition under a "claims-made and reported" policy.1 In Pennzoil-
Quaker State Co. v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co.,2
American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company (AISLIC) is-
sued to Pennzoil-Quaker State Company (Pennzoil) a pollution legal lia-
bility insurance policy for the policy period of October 1, 1999 to October
1, 2002.3 The policy provided coverage for various pollution-related
claims under nine separate coverage provisions.4 One of the coverage
forms obligated AISLIC to:
[P]ay Loss on behalf of the Insured that the Insured becomes le-
gally obligated to pay as a result of Claims first made against the
Insured and reported to the Company in writing during the Policy
Period... for Bodily Injury or Property Damage beyond the bound-
aries of the Insured Property that result from Pollution Conditions. 5
The terms of that particular insuring agreement also provided that
AISLIC had the duty to defend Pennzoil against any claim that was cov-
ered under certain coverage provisions of the policy.6
Five separate lawsuits were filed against Pennzoil between January
2001 and May 2001. 7 In each lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged various per-
sonal injuries and property damage resulting from pollutants allegedly re-
leased by Pennzoil from its refinery in Shreveport, Louisiana.8 The
separate lawsuits were consolidated in June 2003. 9 Pennzoil timely noti-




5. Id. at 693-94.
6. Id. at 694.





fied AISLIC of four of the five lawsuits, but it allegedly did not provide
notice of the fifth (the Shepard suit) until November 28, 2007.10 Pennzoil
nevertheless sought coverage for the Shepard suit, arguing that its failure
to provide timely notice did not preclude coverage under the policy.11
Specifically, Pennzoil argued that because it provided timely notice of
one of the other suits involving the same plaintiffs as those in the Shepard
suit, its notice of that other suit was "de facto notice of the Shepard ac-
tion." 12 Pennzoil further argued that all the suits were consolidated in
2003, thus removing the need to separately report the Shepard suit to
AISLIC.13 Finally, Pennzoil argued that its failure to provide timely no-
tice did not prejudice AISLIC. 14
In examining Pennzoil's arguments and determining whether AISLIC
had a duty to defend Pennzoil in the Shepard suit, the district court ini-
tially noted that the policy at issue was a "claims-made and reported"
policy rather than an "occurrence" policy.15 According to the district
court, this distinction was important, as under an occurrence policy, "any
notice requirement is subsidiary to the event that triggers coverage." 16
Thus, "timely notice is not an essential part of the bargained-for ex-
change."' 7 In contrast, under a claims-made and reported policy, the no-
tice condition is determinative of whether coverage is implicated, as
"notice itself constitutes the event that triggers coverage." 18 As such, the
notice provision of a claims-made and reported policy defines the scope
of coverage for which the insurer may be liable. 19 Thus, it is essential that
the claim be both made and reported by the insured to the insurer during
the policy period or other specified time frame.20 "Allowing coverage
beyond that [specific time frame] would grant the insured more coverage
than he bargained for and would require the insurer to cover risks for
which it had not bargained. '21
Thus, according to the district court, for Pennzoil to be entitled to cov-
erage for the Shepard suit, it must have demonstrated that it (1) received
the claim AND (2) provided notice of the claim to AISLIC within the
applicable policy period or extended reporting period. 22 In denying
Pennzoil's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that
10. Id. at 695.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 695-96.
13. Id. at 697.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 698 (quoting PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. 2008)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d
653, 659 (5th Cir. 1999)).
19. See id. at 698.
20. See id. (citing E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 575
F.3d 520 (5th Cir. 2010)).
21. Id. (citing Komatsu v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied) and Yancey v. Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 923 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied)).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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AISLIC was not required to show that it was prejudiced by Pennzoil's
failure to comply with the notice condition under the policy. 23 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that although the Shepard suit was filed during the
policy period, presumably meaning that Pennzoil received the claim dur-
ing the policy period, Pennzoil did not provide AISLIC with notice of the
suit prior to the expiration of the extended reporting period.24 Impor-
tantly, the district court found that Pennzoil's timely notice of the related
suit involving the same plaintiffs was insufficient to satisfy its obligation
to provide notice in the Shepard Suit. 25 The district court also noted that
"[t]he administrative consolidation of the cases [did] not affect Pennzoil's
notice obligation, particularly because the consolidation did not occur un-
til 2003," which was after the expiration of the extended reporting pe-
riod.26 Pennzoil follows the rule established in Prodigy Communications
Corp. v Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance Co., where the Supreme
Court of Texas noted that because the purpose of the "notice" condition
is to allow the insurer to "close its books" on a policy, an insurer may
only deny coverage for a material breach of that condition.27
III. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
In its 2007 opinion in Mid-Continent Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court held that any "direct claim for
contribution between co-insurers disappears when the insurance policies
contain other insurance or pro rata clauses."' 28 Additionally, the Texas
Supreme Court held that because the right of subrogation is based upon a
situation where the insurer "stands in the shoes" of its insured, if the in-
sured is fully indemnified it will have no right to pass to the insurer for
the insurer to enforce.2 9 Mid-Continent created confusion among policy-
holders and insurers regarding the intended scope of its holdings and the
relative obligations it created among co-insurers. In particular, worries
centered on whether restricting a co-insurer from seeking reimbursement
or contribution from another co-insurer for payments made on behalf of
a mutual insured would hamper settlement negotiations. The concern re-
garding the scope of Mid-Continent was amplified by a 2008 opinion is-
sued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. In Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.,
the federal district court extended Mid-Continent to the duty to defend,
holding that an insurer could not seek reimbursement of defense costs,





27. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374, 382
(Tex. 2009).
28. 236 S.W.3d 765, 772-73 (Tex. 2007).
29. Id. at 775-76.
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refused to contribute to the defense of their common insured.30 During
this Survey period, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court,
finding that the district court had "mischaracterized" the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Mid-Continent.31 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit noted
that Mid-Continent addressed only whether a co-insurer may seek reim-
bursement under its "other insurance" clause through contribution or
subrogation from a non-paying co-insurer for amounts paid to indemnify
their common insured.32
The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that "Mid-Continent left open the
separate question of whether a co-insurer that pays more than its share of
defense costs may recover such costs from a co-insurer who violates its
duty to defend a common insured. '33 In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit
reiterated the long-standing principle that although an insurer may owe
only a portion of the costs associated with the defense of its insured, the
insurer nevertheless has a complete duty to defend that is "equally and
concurrently due" by all insurers. 34 The Fifth Circuit then focused on the
fact that the "other insurance" clause addresses only an insured's "loss"
but does not implicate a similar proration of defense costs. 35 Based on
this, the Fifth Circuit held that the insurer seeking contribution estab-
lished that it made a compulsory payment of more than its proportionate
share of defense costs and was therefore entitled to contribution from the
non-participating insurer.36
Nevertheless, shortly after the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Trinity,
the Third Court of Appeals in Austin criticized the Fifth Circuit's analysis
in Trinity and held that the Fifth Circuit misapplied the holding in Mid-
Continent.37 Specifically, in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Mid-Continent
Casualty Co., Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) and Mid-Continent Cas-
ualty Company (MCCC) 38 shared a common insured that sought cover-
age from both carriers in an underlying suit.39 Truck agreed to defend,
and spent substantial sums in defending the insured through jury trial.40
30. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 718, 728-30
(S.D. Tex. 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 592 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2010). For a detailed
discussion, please refer to the 2008 Insurance Law Survey. J. Price Collins, Ashley E. Friz-
zell & Blake H. Crawford, Family Law Insurance Law, 62 SMU L. Rav. 1267, 1289 (2009).
31. Trinity, 592 F.3d at 694.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 695 (quoting Mid-Continent, 236 S.W.3d at 772). See also Indian Harbor Ins.
Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Group, 535 F.3d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that insurers
must provide a complete defense under Texas law); Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
Sw. Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (noting if one
claim potentially falls within coverage, the insurer must defend the entire suit).
35. Trinity, 592 F.3d at 695.
36. Id.
37. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 320 S.W.3d 613, 622-23 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2010, no pet.).
38. This acronym is used to avoid confusion regarding references to the party involved
in this particular case as opposed to the supreme court's opinion in Mid-Continent.




MCCC, however, refused to defend, and instead filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against the insured in federal court on the coverage issues
after the jury rendered its verdict.4' Truck eventually funded a $2,000,000
judgment against the insured. 42 While the federal declaratory judgment
action was pending, Truck sought declaratory relief in state court that
MCCC owed a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify the insured in the
underlying case and that MCCC was required to reimburse Truck
through contribution, subrogation, and breach of contract for the defense
and settlement costs it paid on behalf of their common insured. 43 After
the federal court declaratory action ended in favor of MCCC, the parties
to the state court declaratory action filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.44
The first issue before the Third Court of Appeals of Texas was whether
the federal court decision in favor of MCCC on the coverage issues pre-
cluded Truck's claims in the state court declaratory action.45 Noting that
all of Truck's claims depended upon a finding that MCCC owed the com-
mon insured a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify in connection with
the underlying case, the court of appeals determined that all the Texas res
judicata factors were present, thus precluding relitgation of the issues that
were resolved in the federal court action.46 The court of appeals recog-
nized that because Truck was precluded from relitigating the coverage
issues in state court, MCCC was entitled to summary judgment. 47
Even though MCCC was entitled to summary judgment based on the
preclusion issue and MCCC had won its own declaratory judgment that it
had no duty to defend the insured, the court of appeals nevertheless
chose to address Truck's second issue regarding whether the supreme
court's holding in Mid-Continent would apply if MCCC had breached its
duty to defend.48 Truck first argued that Mid-Continent should be distin-
guished because it does not bar a contribution claim by a co-insurer
against another co-insurer that breaches the duty to defend. 49 In re-
jecting this argument, the court of appeals noted that "the supreme
court's holding was that, in the absence of a contractual agreement be-
tween the insurers to be obligated for the proportional amount, the pres-
ence of 'other insurance' clauses in the policies precludes an equitable
contribution claim." 50 The court of appeals also noted that in reaching its




44. Id. at 615-16.
45. Id. at 617.
46. Id. at 620-21.
47. Id. at 618-21.
48. Id. at 621.
49. Id. at 622.
50. Id. (citing Mid-Continent, 236 S.W.3d at 773).
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a co-insurer had breached its duty to defend. 51 The court of appeals then
turned to Truck's argument that under the Fifth Circuit's Trinity opinion,
"Mid-Continent does not apply to claims for contribution of defense
costs."'52 Although the co-insurer in Mid-Continent sought reimburse-
ment for settlement costs, the court of appeals noted that the supreme
court had nevertheless relied on cases where a co-insurer was in fact
seeking defense costs. 53 Accordingly, the court of appeals stated that it
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's view that the supreme court had left
unresolved the question of whether a co-insurer may recover when it pays
more than its proportionate share of defense costs, and found that
Truck's contribution claim against MCCC was barred as a matter of law.
54
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit also held in Amerisure In-
surance Co. v. Navigators Insurance Co. that the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in Mid-Continent did not bar a primary auto insurer's contractual
subrogation claim against an excess insurer, even though their common
insured had been fully indemnified.55 In that case, the underlying plain-
tiffs sued the insureds for damages resulting from an auto accident.56 All
parties agreed that prompt settlement was in their best interests. 57 How-
ever, during settlement negotiations, the primary auto insurer insisted
that coverage did not apply due to various exclusions under its policy,
while the excess insurer refused to fund its portion of the settlement until
the primary auto insurer had tendered its $1 million policy limit.58 Ulti-
mately, the primary auto insurer paid $1 million and the excess insurer
paid $1.35 million to settle the case, but the primary auto insurer reserved
the right to seek subrogation from the excess insurer.59 After the district
court denied the primary auto carrier's motion for summary judgment on
that issue, the primary auto insurer appealed. 60
The first issue before the Fifth Circuit was one of first impression:
"whether Mid-Continent precludes contractual subrogation simply be-
cause the insured has been fully indemnified."' 61 In holding that Mid-Con-
tinent does not, the Fifth Circuit stated that it agreed "with [a] majority of
courts that" subrogation still exists when an insured has been fully indem-
nified, rejecting "the overly broad view of Mid-Continent's subrogation
exclusion."' 62 According to the Fifth Circuit, extending the rationale from
51. Id. (citing Employers Cas. Co. v. Trans. Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1969)
and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 169 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. 1943)).
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Employers, 444 S.W.2d at 607; Hicks Rubber, 169 S.W.2d at 148).
54. Id. at 623.
55. 611 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2010).





61. Id. at 305.
62. Id. at 307. See also Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Penn-America Ins. Co., 705 F.
Supp. 2d 646, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (finding that the holding from Mid-Continent is limited);
Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., No. EP-08-CV-285-DB, 2008 U.S.
2011]
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Mid-Continent beyond its application to the specific facts of that case
"would effectively end contractual subrogation in Texas."'63 Finding that
this was not the intent, the Fifth Circuit held "that Mid-Continent does
not bar contractual subrogation simply because the insured is fully
indemnified. "64
Moving on to the issue of whether Mid-Continent precluded subroga-
tion in this case, the Fifth Circuit likewise held that it did not.65 Specifi-
cally, the Fifth Circuit noted that the insured in Mid-Continent "was fully
protected because both insurers acknowledged their duties to defend and
indemnify. '66 There was no dispute that both carriers owed duties to
their common insured. 67 By contrast, in this case, the primary auto in-
surer claimed its policy did not apply, while the excess insurer refused to
indemnify until the primary auto insurer paid its $1 million policy limit.68
Noting "that dueling coinsurers must place the interests of their insureds
before their own[,]" 69 the Fifth Circuit found that applying the Mid-Con-
tinent exclusion to a situation where the carriers disagreed regarding
which one should pay would place the interests of the insured at risk.70
The Fifth Circuit therefore held that Mid-Continent does not bar contrac-
tual subrogation when an insurer denies or otherwise challenges coverage
under its policy.71 The Fifth Circuit specifically explained that a contrary
holding would deviate "from settled principles of Texas insurance law by
discouraging insurers from first defending and indemnifying and then
seeking reimbursement for the costs that a coinsurer should have paid."'72
Dist. LEXIS 107779, at *15-16 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (finding that Mid-Continent was depen-
dent on the pro rata clauses and its holding should not extend beyond the specific facts);
Duininck Bros., Inc. v. Howe Precast, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-441, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70938,
at *24 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining that Mid-Continent is a "narrow case"); Lexington Ins.
Co. v. Chi. Ins. Co., No. H-06-1741, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60629, at *38, 62-63 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
63. Amerisource, 611 P.3d at 307. The Fifth Circuit also recognized that the Texas
Supreme Court recently issued a contractual subrogation case where it allowed a health
insurer to subrogate to the rights of a patient for whom it had paid substantial medical
expenses. Id. (citing Tex. Health Ins. Risk Pool v. Sigmundik, 315 S.W.3d 12, 14-15 (Tex.
2010)). Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, the supreme court did not intend on ending





68. Id. at 308.
69. ld. (quoting Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 444
S.W.2d 583, 588-89 (Tex. 1969)).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. (citing Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20
S.W.3d 692, 703 (Tex. 2000) and Hardware Dealers, 444 S.W.2d at 588-89). See also Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 696, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2010). In Em-
ployers, the district court noted that "[c]ourts applying Mid-Continent have stressed that it
is limited to its facts." Id. The district court also noted that Mid-Continent was never
intended to preclude statutory or contractual subrogation for an "insurer of a seller assert-
ing that its acts or omissions did not cause the underlying plaintiff's injury if the seller's
insurer assumed the insured's defense and paid to settle the claim." Id. at 709.
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Insurance Law
Based on the opinions issued since Mid-Continent, it appears the fed-
eral courts are attempting to limit the holding in that case to its particular
facts, whereas at least one state court has found that the decision is meant
to have a broader application. Because the scope of the Mid-Continent
holding on both the contribution and subrogation issues is still relatively
uncertain, we anticipate that litigation will continue on this topic.
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE DUTY TO DEFEND AND THE DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
It is well established that under Texas law an insurer's duty to defend is
both distinct from and independent of its duty to indemnify.73 Based on
these premises, it was not uncommon for insurers to argue that if their
broader duty to defend was not implicated, their narrower duty to indem-
nify could never be implicated.74 During this Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court held in D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Markel International
Insurance Company, Ltd. that an insurer may have a duty to indemnify in
certain circumstances even though it has no duty to defend.75 In the case,
homeowners sued their general contractor, D.R. Horton, for various al-
leged construction defects related to the construction of their home. 76
D.R. Horton sought coverage for the suit as an additional insured under a
policy Markel International Insurance Company, Limited (Markel) had
issued to one of D.R. Horton's subcontractors. Noting that the home-
owners did not allege that the subcontractor's work was defective or
caused the alleged damage, Markel denied D.R. Horton's request for
coverage. 77 D.R. Horton subsequently settled the lawsuit with the home-
owners and sued Markel for reimbursement of its defense costs and the
amount it paid to settle the suit.78
After Markel filed a motion for summary judgment, D.R. Horton filed
a response arguing that the pleading should be broadly construed to favor
73. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Tex. 2008);
GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. 2006);
Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. 2004); Farmers Tex.
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v.
JHP Dev., Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 2009).
74. See, e.g., Grimes Constr., Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 188 S.W.3d 805, 818
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006), rev'd, 248 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2008) ("The duty to defend is
thus broader than the duty to indemnify; if an insurer has no duty to defend, it has no duty
to indemnify."); Reser v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 981 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1998, no pet.) ("If the underlying petition does not raise factual allegations suffi-
cient to invoke the duty to defend, then even proof of all of those allegations could not
invoke the insurer's duty to indemnify."); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding that no indemnity existed when the duty to
defend did not apply); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Calli Homes, 236 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) ("If the insurer has no duty to defend the insured, no duty to indemnify is
present.").
75. 300 S.W.3d 740, 741, 745 (Tex. 2010).





a defense.79 Moreover, D.R. Horton attached to this response evidence
indicating that the subcontractor was actually responsible for the work
that caused the damage to the home. 80 The trial court granted Markel's
motion; the court of appeals affirmed, further noting that the "eight cor-
ners doctrine" precluded the examination of extrinsic evidence in deter-
mining whether D.R. Horton was entitled to a defense.81 Finally, "[t]he
court of appeals reasoned that because Markel had no duty to defend, it
also had no duty to indemnify D.R. Horton. '82
The question before the Texas Supreme Court was whether Markel had
a duty to indemnify D.R. Horton despite having no duty to defend.83 The
supreme court held that the duty to indemnify is independent of the duty
to defend, and therefore an insurer may have a duty to indemnify its in-
sured even if the duty to defend never arises.84 The supreme court specifi-
cally noted that although Markel's duty to defend D.R. Horton was never
triggered by the allegations in the homeowners' underlying petition, it is
not the "eight corners doctrine," but rather the facts actually established
in the underlying suit or evidence introduced in coverage litigation that
determine the duty to indemnify. 85 Thus, the evidence D.R. Horton
presented in its response to Markel's summary judgment motion raised
sufficient fact questions to defeat Markel's motion for summary judgment
on the duty to indemnify.86 The supreme court also expressly rejected
Markel's reliance on Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Grif-
fin, noting that under the facts presented in that case, there was no possi-
bility that any facts outside the pleadings could have transformed the
drive-by shooting at issue into an auto accident. 87 The supreme court fur-
ther held that it had previously recognized that it may be necessary to
wait to resolve indemnity issues until after the third-party litigation is re-
solved, as coverage could turn on facts developed through that
litigation.88
What appears to be unresolved by D.R. Horton is whether an insurer
that has no duty to defend based on the eight corners of the policy and
the pleadings must nevertheless continue to monitor the underlying litiga-
tion for evidence that may implicate the duty to indemnify. Moreover, it
is not clear whether D.R. Horton only applies in situations where addi-






84. Id. at 745.
85. Id. at 744-45.
86. Id. at 745.
87. Id. The Texas Supreme Court also mentioned that "[s]everal authorities have mis-
takenly cited Griffin" to support the proposition that if no duty to defend exists, there can




under some duty to investigate the actual facts surrounding every claim
submitted for coverage.
V. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE STOWERS DocrRINE
In AFTCO Enterprises, Inc. v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co., the
issue was "whether a settlement offer triggers an insurer's duty to settle
when the plaintiffs' settlement terms require funding from multiple insur-
ers, and no single insurer can fund the settlement within the limits that
apply under its particular policy."'8 9 Noting that the supreme court had
previously left this question unanswered, the First District Court of Ap-
peals of Texas found that the plaintiffs' settlement demand triggered
neither insurer's Stowers duties.90 The underlying personal injury law-
suits arose out of a major traffic accident that occurred in 2003 involving
a tractor-trailer driven by an employee of ETSI, Inc. (ETSI) who was
transporting a trailer provided by AFTCO Enterprises, Inc. (AFTCO). 91
ETSI and AFTCO were insureds under various insurance policies, in-
cluding a $1 million primary policy issued by Southern County Mutual
Insurance Company (Southern) and a $1 million excess policy issued by
Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Company (Acceptance). 92 The under-
lying plaintiffs offered to settle for approximately $2.6 million. 93 South-
ern never responded to this initial demand; Acceptance indicated that it
had no obligation unless and until the limits of all the primary policies
were exhausted.94 The plaintiffs made a subsequent offer of settlement,
demanding the limits of all the insurance policies.95 After failing to settle,
the case went to trial resulting in a verdict in excess of $20 million.96 The
insurers then settled all outstanding claims with the available policy lim-
its, thereby relieving AFTCO and ETSI of liability.97 Thereafter,
AFTCO and ETSI filed suit in state court, alleging that the insurers negli-
gently breached their Stowers duties thereby causing AFTCO and ETSI
to incur attorneys' fees and expenses they would not have had to incur if
the insurers had settled the case before trial.98 After Acceptance and
Southern won summary judgments at the trial court, AFTCO and ETSI
appealed. 99
To determine if Acceptance and Southern breached their Stowers du-
ties, the court of appeals first outlined the general principles of the Stow-
89. 321 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
90. Id. at 69, 72.
91. Id. at 62.
92. Id. at 66-67.






99. Id. at 68.
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ers doctrine, noting first that its purpose is to "[shift] the risk of an excess
judgment from the insured to the insurer by subjecting an insurer to lia-
bility for the wrongful refusal to settle a claim against the insured within
policy limits."' 100 Next, the court of appeals recognized that under Mid-
Continent Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., "in a claim in-
volving multiple policies, a settlement demand does not activate one pri-
mary insurer's Stowers duty unless the demand falls within the applicable
limits available under that single policy."'10 1 The court of appeals then
explained that an excess insurer's Stowers duty is not implicated unless
and until the primary insurers have tendered their limits. 10 2
The court of appeals then turned to whether Southern had breached its
Stowers duty. In holding that it had not, the court of appeals found that
(1) the settlement demand was "directed toward multiple policies and all
of the insurers together, in exchange for a release from multiple plain-
tiffs[;]" (2) the "plaintiffs did not offer to release their claims against
those insured under a particular policy in exchange for the limits availa-
ble under that policy[;]" and (3) "[t]he settlement demand also referred
to [an amount that] was an aggregate of multiple policies and .. .ex-
ceeded the Southern policy's limits."'01 3 The court of appeals also held
that Acceptance's Stowers duty was never implicated because the primary
insurer neither received a demand within its limits nor tendered its limits
pursuant to that demand.' 0 4
VI. COMMON GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES
A. THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION
In Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
the Texas Supreme Court adopted a broad reading of the "contractual
liability" exclusion found in the standard Commercial General Liability
(CGL) policy form.105 Specifically, the supreme court held in Gilbert that
this exclusion applies broadly to exclude coverage for claims where the
insured assumes liability for damages in a contract, unless an exception to
the exclusion is implicated.10 6
At issue in Gilbert was a claim for breach of contract asserted by an
100. Id. at 69 (citing Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tex. 2009); Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group, 1 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).
101. Id. at 70 (citing Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765,
776 (Tex. 2007)).
102. Id. (citing Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20
S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. 2000)).
103. Id. at 71.
104. Id. (citing Keck, 20 S.W.3d at 701 and Emscor Mfg., Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group,
879 S.W.2d 894, 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
105. See 327 S.W.3d 118, 131-32 (Tex. 2010). The supreme court initially issued its
opinion on June 4, 2010, but later withdrew that opinion after the insured filed a motion for
rehearing. After denying that motion, the supreme court issued its December 17, 2010
opinion, which is discussed in this Article.
106. Id. at 132.
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alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract.10 7 The contract at issue
was executed in 1993 by Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority (DART)
and Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. (Gilbert). 10 8 DART contracted for
Gilbert's services as general contractor in constructing a light rail system
in the City of Dallas. In relevant part, the contract provided that Gilbert
would "preserve and protect all structures. . . on or adjacent to the work
site" and:
[P]rotect from damage all existing improvements and utilities (1)
at or near the work site and (2) on adjacent property of a third party
... [and] repair any damage to those facilities, including those that
are the property of a third party, resulting from failure to comply
with the requirements of this contract or failure to exercise reasona-
ble care in performing the work.109
During the course of the DART project, the Dallas area experienced
heavy rains, resulting in the flooding of a building adjacent to the con-
struction site.'10 The owner of the flooded building, RT Realty (RTR),
filed suit against DART, its contractors, and various other entities in-
volved in the project, alleging the water damage to the building was the
result of the nearby construction activities."1' RTR sued Gilbert, both in
tort and for breach of contract, arguing that Gilbert had assumed liability
for such damages in its contract with DART.112 Claiming to be a third-
party beneficiary of that contract, RTR asserted that Gilbert was liable to
RTR for the breach.11 3 In addition to its primary CGL policy, Gilbert
had several layered excess coverage policies through Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London (Underwriters).114 While Gilbert's primary insurer,
Argonaut Insurance Company, assumed Gilbert's defense, Underwriters
sent several reservation of rights letters to Gilbert, noting that its policy
did not include a duty to defend Gilbert, and that coverage for the dam-
ages sought by RTR could not yet be determined but depended upon the
judgment rendered and facts found in the suit.115
The defendants in RTR's suit moved for summary judgment based on
DART's governmental immunity as a subdivision of the state, and Gil-
bert's immunity as DART's contractor."16 The trial court granted the
summary judgment motions with respect to all claims in the suit except
RTR's breach of contract claim against Gilbert. 117 Shortly thereafter, in
another reservation of rights letter to Gilbert, Underwriters adopted the
position that damages sought in RTR's breach of contract claim were not
107. Id. at 121.
108. Id. at 121-22
109. Id. at 122.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 121.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 122.
115. Id. at 122-23.




covered under the policy due to the policy's contractual liability exclu-
sion, which bars coverage for "property damage" for which the insured is
obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a
contract or agreement. 118 However, the "exclusion does not apply to lia-
bility for damages: (1) [a]ssumed in a contract or agreement that is an
'insured contract;' or (2) [tjhat the insured would have in the absence of
the contract or agreement."119
Gilbert settled the breach of contract claim with RTR for $6.175 mil-
lion; Underwriters denied coverage.120 Following settlement with RTR,
Gilbert brought a suit against Underwriters, alleging breach of contract
for its denial of coverage. 21 The trial court granted Gilbert's motion for
summary judgment with respect to coverage under the policy.122 How-
ever, the court of appeals reversed finding for Underwriters. 2 3 The court
of appeals held that the contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for
RTR's breach of contract claim, and that the second exception to the ex-
clusion, allowing coverage for liability the insured would have even in the
absence of the contract, was inapplicable. 124
At the supreme court, Underwriters conceded that RTR's claim fell
within the broad, general terms of the policy; however, it asserted that
because Gilbert's only basis for liability was Gilbert's contractual obliga-
tions assumed in the DART contract, the contractual liability exclusion
applied to bar coverage.1 25 Gilbert advanced a "narrow" reading of the
contractual liability exclusion, arguing that the "assumption" in the exclu-
sion referred only to the assumption of "liability of another such as in
hold-harmless or indemnity agreements.' 2 6 Gilbert asserted that the su-
preme court's opinion in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty
Co. supported its position. 12 7 Gilbert also argued that, "at the very least,
the [contractual liability] exclusion [was] ambiguous," and thus should
"be interpreted in favor of finding coverage.' 28 In the alternative, Gil-
bert argued that, even if the court found the exclusion to be applicable, its
liability to RTR fell within the second exception to the exclusion. 129
Under this exception, coverage is restored for the insured's liability for
damages that it would bear even in the absence of the contract or
agreement.130
118. Id.
119. Id. at 124.





125. Id. at 125.
126. Id.
127. Id. (see Lamar Homes Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2007)).
128. Id.




The supreme court rejected Gilbert's reading of the contractual liability
exclusion, finding that the exclusion barred coverage for the liability in
question and that the instant case did not fall within one of the exceptions
to the exclusion.131 Specifically, the supreme court noted that "Gilbert
agreed under its contract with DART to 'repair any damage to ... facili-
ties, including those that are the property of a third party, resulting from
failure to comply with the requirements of this contract or failure to exer-
cise reasonable care in performing the work."' 132 Because Gilbert had
defeated all potential tort liability through summary judgment, the only
remaining theory of liability arose from Gilbert's contract with DART, or
in other words, "an obligation or liability contractually assumed by
Gilbert." 133
While Gilbert argued that a broader reading of the exclusion renders
the term "assumption" superfluous, the supreme court characterized Gil-
bert's suggested interpretation as a "judicial rewrit[ing] of the insurance
policy"-effectively, inserting an additional word so as to exclude only
assumption of "another's liability. '134 The supreme court found the lan-
guage of the exclusion to be plain and unambiguous and, had the parties
intended the narrow exclusion for which Gilbert advocates, they easily
could have drafted a policy to that effect. 135 The supreme court noted
that the parties did, in fact, use such specific language in the "insured
contract" definition, which references the assumption of "the tort liability
of another.' 136 Thus, the supreme court's interpretation of the exclusion
is consistent with the general objective of contract interpretation in read-
ing each provision so as to harmonize the agreement as a whole and to
give meaning and effect to each provision.
Discounting the proposition that "assumption" referred only to the as-
sumption of another's liability, the supreme court held that the exclusion
applies in those situations in which the insured is obligated to pay dam-
ages by reason of the contractual assumption of liability beyond its obli-
gations under general law. 137 Because Gilbert already owed a duty to
RTR under general law principles to exercise reasonable care in perform-
ing its work, the supreme court concluded that the obligation to pay for
damages "resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements of this
contract" represented an additional liability Gilbert assumed by con-
tract.' 38 Having found that the exclusion applied, the supreme court also
rejected Gilbert's assertion that the exclusion was ambiguous; rather, the
supreme court found the language of the exclusion to be straightforward
and subject to only one "reasonable interpretation. '139
131. Id. at 121.
132. Id. at 126.
133. Id. at 127.
134. Id. at 126.
135. Id. at 134.
136. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 127.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 134.
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The supreme court recognized that other jurisdictions, including the
Fifth Circuit, have adopted more narrow interpretations of the exclu-
sion.140 However, the supreme court noted that one of the leading cases
on which these courts relied had interpreted an earlier and more limited
version of the standard CGL form at issue.141 In distinguishing those
cases, the supreme court found that principles of insurance policy inter-
pretation and the plain language of the contract before them dictate a
broader reading of the exclusion.142 The court specifically explained that:
The exclusion means what it says. It applies when the insured as-
sumes liability for bodily injury or property damages by means of
contract, unless an exception to the exclusion brings a claim back
into coverage or unless the insured would have liability in the ab-
sence of the contract or agreement. 143
The supreme court also rejected Gilbert's argument that its holding
"effectively eviscerates" the Lamar Homes opinion, pointing out that the
contractual liability exclusion was not at issue in that case.144 The su-
preme court also noted that it did not address the duty to indemnify in
Lamar Homes, whereas here Gilbert had already settled its contractual
claims with RTR. 145 Finally, the supreme court considered Gilbert's al-
ternative argument that the second exception to the exclusion restored
coverage.'46 Under the second exception, the contractual liability exclu-
sion "does not apply to liability for damages ... that the insured would
have in the absence of the contract or agreement.' 47 According to Gil-
bert, in the absence of its contract with DART, it would not have had
governmental immunity, and therefore would have been liable in tort on
RTR's negligence claim. Such a basis for liability, Gilbert argued, would
be independent of any contractual assumption of liability in the DART
contract. 148 However, the supreme court rejected this argument,149 say-
ing that because Gilbert asserted no other basis for its settlement than
RTR's breach of contract claim, Gilbert's settlement payment for which it
sought indemnity simply was not a liability for damages it had apart from
its contract with DART.150 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals' judgment in favor of Underwriters.' 5'
140. Id. at 129.
141. Id. at 130 (citing Olympic, Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 648 P.2d 1008 (Alaska
1982)).
142. Id. at 131-32.
143. Id. at 132.
144. Id.




149. Id. at 134.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 137. The supreme court also rejected Gilbert's argument that Underwriters
was estopped from denying coverage. Id. Noting its opinion from Ulico Casualty Co. v.
Allied Pilots Assoc., 262 S.W.3d 773, 782 (Tex. 2008), that estoppel cannot be used to




In Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the
issue was whether a claimant had asserted claims of "property damage"
against an insured. 152 In the underlying case, Building Specialties, Inc.
contracted to install heating and air conditioning insulation at a home in
Houston, Texas.153 After completing its work, water began leaking from
an air conditioning grill located in the home's ballroom. 154 The general
contractor made repeated demands that Building Specialties pay for the
costs associated with tearing down the ceiling, fixing the problem, and
replacing the ceiling in the ballroom. 155 After these requests were ig-
nored, the general contractor sued Building Specialties, alleging, in part,
that it had "designed and installed the heating and air conditioning duct
work" and that "defects in the installation of the duct work were discov-
ered. '1" 56 Building Specialties tendered the lawsuit for coverage to its
CGL insurer Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty). 157 Lib-
erty denied coverage for many reasons, including the lack of "property
damage," due to "no allegation[s] of damage to tangible property or loss
of use of tangible property. 1 58 Building Specialties subsequently settled
and sued Liberty, asserting breach of the insurance contract.' 59 Both par-
ties moved for summary judgment.160
The district court focused its discussion on the "property damage" re-
quirement of the Coverage A insuring agreement.' 61 The district court
recognized that in Lamar Homes, the Texas Supreme Court held that for
purposes of the duty to defend, allegations of unintended construction
defects might constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence,"
sufficient to trigger an insurer's defense obligation. 62 However, the dis-
trict court found that this holding was inapplicable to the case at bar be-
cause in Lamar Homes, the underlying claimants specifically alleged that
the insured's work caused physical damage to other property.1 63 In find-
ing for Liberty, the district court stated:
In this case ... the amended petition in the underlying litigation
alleged only that the duct work was defective and had to be replaced.
There were no allegations of any resulting physical damage to the
not have had coverage for the contract claims regardless of whether Underwriters assumed
control of its defense, Gilbert could not show that it was prejudiced by an action of Under-
writers. See Gilbert, 327 S.W.3d at 136-37.
152. See 712 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639-40 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
153. Id. at 631.
154. Id. at 632.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 632-33.
157. Id. at 632.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 633.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 637.





duct work itself or to other parts of the house or to the loss of use.
The petition sought damages only for the cost of repairing the defec-
tive duct work. The petition alleged defective work by the insured
but did not allege that the defective work caused physical injury or
loss of use. 164
Accordingly, the district court held as a matter of law there was no
duty to defend because the underlying lawsuit did not claim covered
property damage. 165
The holding in Building Specialties follows the already established prin-
ciple that there is simply no "property damage" if the work done by an
insured is immediately unsatisfactory as soon as completed or otherwise
unsatisfactory while being performed.166 As the Fifth Court of Appeals
of Texas has stated, where the term "physical injury" is not defined, "the
plain meaning connotes an alteration in appearance, shape, color, or in
other material dimension."'1 67 Accordingly, there is no "property dam-
age" if the property was not changed from a satisfactory state into an
unsatisfactory state, or otherwise physically altered. 168 This opinion and
the cases cited by the district court suggest, if the insured's defective work
itself was not damaged and caused no damage to other property, there
can be no "property damage" under a CGL policy.
C. THE "BUSINESS RISK" EXCLUSIONS
During this Survey period, several courts issued opinions analyzing the
scope of the various "business risk" exclusions. 169 In particular, in Essex
Insurance Co. v. Hines, the Fifth Circuit again examined the scope of ex-
clusion j(5), which bars coverage for "property damage to 'that particular
164. Id. at 645 (citing 3 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESEN-
TATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 11:1 (5th ed. 2010) ("[I]t is not
enough that the party suing the insured has incurred property damage; the damages being
sought must be because of that property damage. And the issue is not whether the insured
could be sued for such damages, but whether it is being sued for such damages")).
165. Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
166. Id. at 642; see Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 202
S.W.3d 823, 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. withdrawn); Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 200 S.W.3d 651, 678-79 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. filed) (holding
that products "already in an unsatisfactory state when applied" are inherently defective
and thus do not constitute "property damage"); Fritz Indus., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters
Ins. Co., No. 3:02-CV-894-L, 2004 WL 396258, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2004); see generally 3 AL-
LAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATIONS OF INSURANCE COM-
PANIES & INSUREDS § 11:1 (5th ed. 2010) ("[T]he installation/incorporation of a defective
product into a larger product can constitute property damage to the larger product. It has,
however, been held that the mere incorporation of an insured's defective work/product
into a larger product does not constitute property damage if the defective work/product
did not cause physical damage to the larger product; that is, if the alleged harm is limited to
the cost of replacing the insured's defective work/product.").
167. Summit Custom Homes, 202 S.W.3d at 828 (citing Lennar Corp., 200 S.W.3d at
678-79).
168. Lennar Corp., 200 S.W.3d at 678-79.
169. Under the standard form CGL policy, the "business risk" exclusions are exclusions
j., k., 1., In., and n.
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part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because
"your work" was incorrectly performed on it.' 1 70 Relying on Mid-Conti-
nent Casualty Co. v. JHP Development, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that
the "that particular part" language "limits the scope of the exclusion to
damage to parts of the property that were actually worked on by the in-
sured.' 71 The Eastern District of Texas also examined the scope of ex-
clusion j(4), which bars coverage for damage to "[p]ersonal property in
the care, custody or control of the insured."'1 72 In the underlying case, the
insured was responsible for "making welding repairs between deliveries
of flammable condensate into a disposable trough. 1 73 The insured "al-
legedly failed to properly wash and rinse the salt water trough," and when
the welding resumed, a fire broke out causing extensive damage. 174 The
insurer argued that because the insured was performing welding work on
the trough when the fire started, the equipment and pieces compromising
the trough were in its "care, custody, or control. '175 The district court
held that the exclusion "applies only to the particular object of the in-
sured's work, usually personally, and to other property which [the in-
sured] totally and physically manipulates.' 1 76 Because there were no
allegations that the insured had the right to exercise dominion or control
over the trough, the district court found that this exclusion did not
apply. 177
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, LLC, the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas examined the scope of exclusion k., which bars coverage for
"'property damage' to 'your product' arising out of or any part of it."'1 78
In the standard CGL form, the term "your product" is defined, in part, as
"[a]ny goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold,
handled, distributed, or disposed of by [the insured].' 79 The underlying
dispute arose out of damage to a reactor that the insured was hired to
service. 180 After arbitration resulted in an award of damages against the
insured, litigation ensued regarding the coverage issues.' 8 ' In that cover-
age action, one of the insurer's arguments was that exclusion k. barred
coverage because the insured "handled" the damaged goods and products
in the course of performing its work at the refinery. 182 In response, the
insured argued that pursuant to noscitur a sociis, the term "handled"
170. 358 Fed. Appx. 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2010).
171. Id. (quoting Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 214 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
172. Essex Ins. Co. v. McFadden, No. 6:09-CV-193, 2010 WL 2246293, at *8 (E.D. Tex.
2010).
173. Id. at *1.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *7.
176. Id. (quoting Goswick v. Employers' Cas. Co., 440 S.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Tex. 1969)).
177. Id.
178. 717 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 674.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 687.
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means something similar to manufactured, sold, distributed, or disposed
of.183 The insurer argued that interpreting "handled" this way would
render that term meaningless under the policy, and that the "'everyday
meaning" of the word, which is 'to try or examine with the hand,' should
be applied."' 184
In addressing the issue, the district court noted that the Fifth Circuit
has held that "handled" in the context of the "your product" exclusion
means "'to deal or trade in' rather than 'to touch." 185 The district court
also specifically found that the insurer's intent to restrict the word "han-
dled" is apparent from its inclusion with "manufactured, sold, distributed,
or disposed of."1 86 Noting that other jurisdictions have agreed with the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of "handled," the court found that because
there was no evidence that the insured "bought, sold, dealt, traded in, or
supplied any of the materials it used in performing its work on the...
reactor," the "your product" exclusion did not apply.
187
VII. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY POLICIES
The Fifth Circuit recently analyzed two significant issues with respect
to exclusions in directors' and officers' liability policies (D&O policies).
Specifically, in Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London, the Fifth Circuit court analyzed the implications of the "deter-
mined in fact" language common in certain exclusions found in D&O
policies and whether the "eight corners rule" restricts an insurer from
examining extrinsic evidence to determine if it should pay defense costs
under a policy that does not impose a duty to defend.' 88 In Pendergest,
Underwriters issued a D&O policy to certain companies founded by R.
Allen Stanford.1 89 After conducting an extensive investigation, the Se-
curities Exchange Commission (SEC) sued three of these companies and
numerous individual executives (the executives) in February 2009, alleg-
ing that the companies and executives had sold investors worthless certifi-
cates of deposit through a Ponzi scheme.1 90 In June 2009, the government
also filed a twenty-one count criminal indictment charging four of the
executives "with conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and securities fraud,
wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct an SEC investigation, ob-
struction of an SEC investigation, and conspiracy to commit money
laundering.'1 91
The executives sought coverage for these actions under the D&O pol-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 688.
185. Id. The court also noted that the dictionary definition of the term "handled" is "to
buy and sell; to deal, or trade in." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DIcTION-
ARY 550 (1990)).
186. Id. at 687.
187. Id.
188. 600 F.3d 562, 565, 567 (5th Cir. 2010).





icy issued by Underwriters. 192 This policy provided that Underwriters
would pay for "[f]oss resulting from any Claim first made during the Pol-
icy Period for a Wrongful Act. 1 93 The D&O policy imposed no duty to
defend, instead obligating Underwriters to reimburse the executives for
covered defense costs they incurred in defending themselves against
claims, provided they notified Underwriters before these defense costs
were incurred. ' 194 Underwriters agreed initially to advance the defense
costs to the executives, but expressly reserved their rights with respect to
the "fraud" and "money laundering" exclusions. 195
The "money laundering" exclusion barred "coverage for loss (including
defense costs) resulting from any claim 'arising directly or indirectly as a
result of or in connection with any act or acts (or alleged act or acts) of
Money Laundering [as defined in the D&O policy].' "196 However, the
exclusion did provide for the qualified reimbursement of defense costs in
limited circumstances "until such time that it is determined that the alleged
act or alleged acts [of Money Laundering] did in fact occur. '197
Underwriters subsequently informed the executives they would no
longer provide coverage for the defense costs because the Underwriters
had determined from the available evidence that "Money Laundering"
had, in fact, occurred.1 98 The executives sued Underwriters "seeking
damages, a declaration that their defense costs must be reimbursed under
the D&O policy, and a preliminary injunction ordering the Underwriters
to pay their defense costs until a final judgment on the merits of the cov-
erage dispute."1 99 Underwriters sought an expedited appeal after deter-
mining that the "money laundering" exclusion likely would not apply, the
district court granted the executives' injunction.20 0 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit initially noted that two predicate issues required resolution: (1)
who makes the "in fact" determination (i.e., whether Underwriters' du-
ties end under the policy when they make an "in fact" determination,
subject to judicial review, or whether a court alone can make this deter-
mination); and (2) what can be considered in making the "in fact" deter-
mination (i.e., whether a carrier or court can review extrinsic information
or if they are constrained the pleadings and policy).
Although the dictionary definitions of the terms "determined" and "in
fact" supported the conclusion that a judicial decision maker must make
the "in fact" decision, the Fifth Circuit court found that these definitions
provided no conclusive answer on the issue. 20 ' The Fifth Circuit court
then noted that had Underwriters desired to fill the interpretive "void,"




196. Id. at 567.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 567-68.
199. Id. at 568.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 571.
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they "could have unambiguously reserved a unilateral right to determine
that the alleged acts in fact occurred. '20 2 Because the terms of the D&O
policy provided no clear direction, the court then turned to the parties'
respective arguments.
Underwriters argued that they make the "in fact" determination and
that their decision is "subject only to judicial reversal after the fact. °20 3
Conversely, the executives argued that a court must first make the "in
fact" determination, and "that the underwriters' duties continue until
they have a court judgment in hand, decreeing that [the wrongful act] was
'in fact' committed. '20 4 The Fifth Circuit court found that, in the absence
of the insurer's unambiguous reservation of the right to make a unilateral
coverage decision, the use of the "determined" language in conjunction
with "in fact" language requires a judicial determination on the issue.20 5
In reaching its holding, the Fifth Circuit court further explained that
the true question is not whether a court makes the "in fact" determina-
tion, but during which part of the judicial proceeding this determination
is made.20 6 The Fifth Circuit court contrasted the language from the "fi-
nal adjudication" requirement sometimes used in D&O policies, with that
from the "in fact" requirement at issue. 20 7 Citing the fact that "courts
have generally imbued 'in fact' language with a broader scope than 'final
adjudication,' holding ... that the term requires a final decision on the
merits in either the underlying case or a separate coverage case, or an
admission by the insured," the court found that by including the "in fact"
language the insurer had effectively "reserve[d] the right to litigate the
coverage question outside of the underlying action. '208 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit court found that the terms of the D&O policy, in requiring
Underwriters to advance defense costs until an "in fact" determination
was made by the court, "require recourse to something more than mere
allegations. "209
Having found that a court-not the insurer-must decide whether the
"determined in fact" language is satisfied, the Fifth Circuit court then
turned to the question of what evidence may be considered in making
that decision.210 The executives argued that the "eight corners" rule ap-
plied, but the court rejected this contention, noting that the Texas Su-
preme Court has only used this rule in duty-to-defend cases and that no
other Texas state courts have applied the rule to a case where a duty-to-
advance defense-cost policy is at issue.21 1 Moreover, according to the
Fifth Circuit court, there was no need to reach the issue of whether the
202. Id.
203. Id. at 570.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 573-74.
206. See id. at 574.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 573.





eight corners rule applied, as the parties in this case contracted around
the eight comers rule in plain language by clearly agreeing that extrinsic
evidence would be used in making the "in fact" determination. 212
VIII. HOMEOWNERS' POLICIES
In State Farm Lloyds v. Page, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed
whether claims for mold damage resulting from plumbing leaks were cov-
ered by a standard homeowners' insurance policy.213 The policy at issue
was a Standardized Homeowners Policy-Form B (HO-B policy), which
provided coverage for the dwelling and the contents of the dwelling.214
The insured, after finding mold and water damage in her home, sought
coverage for that damage under her HO-B policy.21 5 An investigation of
the plumbing revealed that leaks in the sanitary sewer lines were the
cause of the mold and water damage. 216 After receiving payment for
remediation and repair of the structure, remediation of her personal
property, and her living expenses, the insured sought additional funds to
remedy the damage to the carpet in the home.21 7 When the insurer re-
fused to pay, the insured filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things,
breach of contract. 218 The trial court found for the insurer; the court of
appeals reversed.21 9
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court was "the extent of coverage
[the insured's] HO-B policy affords for mold contamination resulting
from plumbing leaks. '220 The supreme court began its analysis by ex-
plaining that the HO-B policy provided two separate coverage forms:
Coverage A for damage to the insured dwelling against "all risks," and
Coverage B for damage to the insured's personal property against twelve
enumerated perils, including "plumbing leaks." Both coverage forms
were subject to various exclusions, including an exclusion that barred cov-
erage for loss caused by mold.221 Pursuant to an "exclusion repeal provi-
sion" found under Coverage B, however, the "mold" exclusion did not
bar coverage for loss caused by "plumbing leaks. '222
The insurer argued that under Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,223 the su-
preme court had "unequivocally construed the same policy there to ex-
clude all mold damage to a dwelling irrespective of its cause. '224 The
insured argued that Fiess was limited to circumstances involving leaks
212. Id. at 574-75.
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from roofs and windows, and pointed to Balandran v. Safeco Insurance
Co. of America22 5 to support her position that when the "mold" exclusion
and "exclusion repeal provision" are read together, the Coverage A in-
suring agreement under the HO-B policy "expressly cover[s] mold dam-
age caused by plumbing leaks. '226 The insured argued in the alternative
that an ambiguity existed, thereby affording coverage under the HO-B
policy.227
The supreme court held that the policy did not provide coverage for
mold damage to the dwelling, but that neither its opinion from Fiess nor
from Balandran was "directly on point. '228 With respect to Fiess, the su-
preme court noted that while its decision "was unquestionably broad,"
that decision did not "unequivocally [vitiate] coverage for all mold dam-
age no matter the cause. '229 Regarding Balandran, the supreme court
noted that it had analyzed the "exclusion repeal provision" in conjunction
with a "foundation movement" exclusion, not under a "mold" exclu-
sion.2 30 Rather, the supreme court explained that it agreed with Car-
rizales v. State Farm Lloyds,2 3 1 where the Fifth Circuit had recently
concluded that the "interaction between the mold exclusion and the 'ex-
clusion repeal provision' under Coverage B did not create an ambigu-
ity." 232 The supreme court explained that if it were to adopt the insured's
argument that the "exclusion repeal provision" reinstated coverage for
mold damage to the dwelling caused by plumbing leaks, it would make
the mold exclusion "entirely nugatory. '233 Rather, according to the su-
preme court, reading the "exclusion repeal provision" to reinstate cover-
age only for mold damage to the insured's personal property caused by
plumbing leaks gives the policy's provisions their full effect.2 34 The Texas
Supreme Court therefore held that mold damage to the insured dwelling
resulting from plumbing leaks was not covered by the HO-B policy.
2 35
The supreme court did state in dicta, however, that the "exclusion re-
peal provision" did in fact reinstate coverage for damages to the insured's
personal property caused by mold from plumbing leaks. 236 This decision
answered an important issue that affects many Texas insureds regarding
the scope of coverage under the standard homeowners' policy for com-
mon claims arising from plumbing leaks. Now that the supreme court has
expressly found that the "mold" exclusion applies to bar coverage for
damage to an insured's dwelling, but does not apply to bar coverage for
225. 972 S.W.2d 738, 738 (Tex. 1998).
226. Page, 315 S.W.3d at 528.
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231. 518 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
232. Page, 315 S.W.3d at 530-31 (citing Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 346).
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damage to the insured's personal property, both policyholders and in-
sured will have better guidance for both policyholders and insurers re-
garding the risks covered under these common policies.
IX. CONCLUSION
During this Survey period, Texas courts continued to examine impor-
tant issues arising under various insurance policies and affecting both pol-
icyholders and insurers. Significantly, when the Texas Supreme Court
issued Gilbert, the decision was controversial. In fact, the insured filed a
motion for rehearing supported by briefing from those in the insurance
industry in an effort to have the supreme court reconsider its decision.
Nevertheless, the supreme court denied the insured's motion and re-is-
sued an opinion nearly identical to its original. Whether this will quell
litigation on issues created by that case remains to be seen.
We do expect that litigation will continue in the future, however, with
respect to notice issues under claims-made policies and the relative rights
of co-insurers through contribution and subrogation, as these areas of law
continue to evolve in the wake of recent significant opinions. In particu-
lar, there have been some inconsistent holdings between the federal and
state courts on the issue of a co-insurer's right of subrogation. We antici-
pate that the Texas Supreme Court will need to revisit the issues ad-
dressed in Mid-Continent in the near future to provide guidance on the
intended scope of that opinion and to resolve the issues that have created
the conflicting holdings in state and federal courts.
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